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Communicative grammar: 
towards a linguistic model of interpretive activity* 
I. Intro 
In searching for a rationale validating their methodological choices, linguists of-
ten appeal to a distinctive "passkey" -the "linguistic point of view". And, alas, there is 
hardly any agreement between various linguistic parties as to who could be the privi-
leged one to decide where this point lies ( or, to invoke a self-explanatorial "hedge," 
where this point "really" lies). In the face of such confusion, resorting to a primary 
source of linguistic data- the comerstone of an empirically-oriented linguistic frame-
work - might constitute a relatively non-controversial means of escaping the pitfalls 
of an idle, methodological tug-of-war. Simultaneously, it might also permit taking into 
consideration some vital aspects of human communication often disregarded in con-
temporary linguistic approaches. 
As we see it, this primitive source of linguistic data (and by no means the data 
itself) is a concrete, individual, communicating agent - one who speaks, interprets 
utterances, and communicates with his interlocutor(s) in the concrete communicative 
environment. This way of putting it calls attention to the fact that human linguistic 
activity is, by its very nature, a behavioral phenomenon, and that language itself, being 
primarily a form of social behavior, should not be treated as separate from other kinds 
of human communicative activity. Stating this self-evident truth, we would like to 
indicate consequences of an Archimedean point of linguistic reasoning. 
Certainly, the number ofthose who think language exists primarily as an autono-
mous semiotic system, or those who would be willing to argue the ontological status 
of sucha semiotic object, is legion. Still, very few contemporary linguists would seri-
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ously dismiss thinking about language in terms of social behavior as illegitimate or 
unsound. Existing controversies regarding the nature oflinguistic phenomena clearly 
show that theoretical representations of " linguistic facts" should be interpreted seri-
ously, albeit definitely not literally. What it means practically is that the value of a 
particular linguistic theory, framework, and model should be evaluated in its relation 
to human communicative (inter)activity. 
Thus, objects in the "communicative environment" that are to be identified for 
linguistic investigati n can be given as agents in their (inter)communicative activity, 
the linguistic products of this activity - utterances, and situations (their pragmatic 
settings included), within which this verba! and nonverbal (inter)activity emerges. 
Delineating the research area this way, we are naturally trying to stick to the basie 
tenets of empirical linguistics. 
Significantly enough, in the course of the history oflinguistic thinking, these three 
incommensurable realms of linguistic communication (agents, utterances, and situa-
tions) have continually emerged as elements ofvarious linguistic approaches . These 
approaches testify to the constitutive value of human, overall meaningful, and inter-
pretive behavior in concrete acts of communication, solving the "problem oflanguage". 
It seems that solely in relation to this kind of action can one understand cognitive and 
linguistic (inter)activity of communi cating agents, and recognize the products of this 
activity - meaningful phenomena with their perceivable communicative counterparts 
- as linguistically relevant facts. 
As is evident, we make no pretense at neutrality here. Nevertheless, rather than 
trying to promote a particular linguistic theory at the outset, we would like to pose and 
very briefly discuss severa! metalinguistic ( or even, horribile dictu, philosophical) 
ideas, which have led our thinking to the position which we presently take. They may 
appear somewhat controversial, so we will refer to the source text to allow the author 
of the ideas being introduced to speak for himself. 
2. The Openness and Groundlessness of Linguistic Phenomena 
and Wittgenstein 's Perspective 
According to Wittgenstein's later philosophy, the ultimate justification or ultimate 
foundation of our language and our linguistic activity is simply our everyday practice 
- what we commonly do when speaking, interpreting, and understanding linguistic 
signs that emerge in concrete acts of communication. And this practice itself appears 
to be a tenninal point to which we may appeal in our quest for the foundation of 
linguistic behavior. Thus, language, by its very essence, introduces itself as a symbolic 
activity that constitutes (and not only rejl.ects) our everyday practice - simply one of 
our primordial givens that cannot be explained, justified or grounded. "Life forms," in 
which the linguistic activity of communicating agents is deeply rooted, function as a 
kind ofparadigm that determine which people's actions are significant or meaningful 
and which are not. There are, ultimately, no other conditions by which means we could 
question or approve them. Thus, language and its gram.mar, as seen from this perspec-
tive, do not constitute norms of significancy but rather substantiate standards and rules 
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that organize the linguistic practice of a particular community into coherent, meaning-
ful behavior. 
From the point of view adopted here, the most important thread within the previ-
ously invoked sequence of Wittgenstein 's thinking is a set of his findings conceming 
the very status of grammatical rules. According to him, the scope of influence that 
grammatical rules seems to "exert" upon the speaking agents does not seem to be 
determined by their properties, but rather by the way in which those rui es are inter-
preted by their followers. In other words, there is no direct causal relationship be-
tween grammatical rules themselves and the linguistic activity of communicating 
agents. There is also no causa! or detenninistic relationship of any kind between 
these two groups of objects of various ontological status. Qui te the opposite, it is 
communicative agents who decide to follow the dictate of rules or to dismiss them 
as useless. If it so happens that agents act in a way that could be interpreted as 
conforming to the dictate of some particular rule, it definitely happens because of 
their own decision to !et themselves be "guided" by this particular rule. Therefore, it 
appears, there is nothing inherent in the very nature of the rules about which we are 
speaking - even those reflecting logical or mathematical necessity - that could ab-
solutely and irrevocably force agents to follow them. This "voluntarist" or (a/ 
anti)nomist momentum is clearly connected with the problematic question of the 
relationship between meaning, interpretation, and understanding along with their 
influence (or lack thereof) on the very practice of employing these rules . Relevant 
passages of Philosophical Investigations explain: 
But how can a rule show me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is , on 
some interpretation, in accord with the rule." - That is not what we ought to say, 
but rather: any interpretation stili hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and 
cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning 
(Wittgenstein 1958: § 198). 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be detennined by a rule, because 
every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule . The answer was: if 
everything can be made out to accord with the rule, than it can also be made out to 
conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. 
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the 
course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one 
contented us at least for a moment, until we thought ofyet another standing behind 
it. What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpre-
tation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against 
it" in actual case . 
Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an inter-
pretation. But we ought to restrict the term "interpretation" to the substitution of 
one expression of the rule for another (Wittgenstein 1958: § 201 ). 
And hence also "obeying a rule" is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is 
not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule "privately": otherwise 
thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it (Wittgenste-
in 1958: § 202). 
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Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react 
to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and ano-
ther in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?[ .. . ] The common 
behaviour ofmankind is the system ofreference by means ofwhich we interpret an 
unknown language (Wittgenstein 1958: § 206). 
The rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is 
to be followed through the whole of space. - But if something of this sort really 
were the case, ho would it help? 
No; my description only made sense if it was to be understood symbolically. - I 
should have said: This is how it strikes me. 
When I obey a rule, I do not choose. 
I obey the rule blindly (Wittgenstein 1958: § 219). 
The rule can only seem to me to produce all its consequences in advance if I draw 
them as a matter of course (Wittgenstein 1958: § 238). 
As is thus made evident, acting and communicating agents may easily misunder-
stand the "gist" of the rules they follow; they may even interpret them incorrectly or 
obey them "blindly", and then, despite that fact, proceed according to the expectations 
oftheir interlocutors. Nothing in the "nature" ofthese rules-and Wittgenstein's cases 
make this explicit - enforces any "proper" or even particular way of conforming to 
them. Moreover, nothing forces them to conform to these rules at all. Everything de-
pends on the decisions of the agents themselves. Stili, if any justification of abidance 
by the rui es ( or their rationale) must be sought, the only answer could be other rui es or 
the very fact that this particular way of acting is simply amatter of course. 
"How am I able to obey a rule", asks Wittgenstein, and comments, "ifthis is not a 
question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the tule in 
the way I do. Ifl have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my 
spade is tumed. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do ' (Wittgenstein 
1958: § 218). 
Seeing the problem of human linguistic activity from this perspective it could be 
stated that it is the grammar itself which justifies the way people speak, because of its 
normativity. And it is norms that have the power of justifying any culturally standard-
ized behavior, which speaking no doubt is . But grammar itself standardizes that part of 
linguistic behavior which people exercise most often wherever these standards em-
body the very rules of correctness. Thus, any attempt to explain meaningful linguistic 
phenomena that tries to go beyond them, towards some unfathomable instances that 
were to "justify" or "validate" them (these being "coded rules", "deep structures of 
sense", or other objects " rooted in" socially constructed reality) , are bound to fai!. 
True, the last instance to which one can appeal in this inquiry is the non-justified and 
non-grounded linguistic and interactive activity of communicating agents, but the study 
ofthis domain cannot yield any "explanations" for the above-mentioned phenomena. 
"Explanations" of that kind cannot be found in a realm where the indeterminacy of 
linguistic signs goes hand in hand with the very lack of a causal determination be-
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tween the rules of manipulating signs and the sovereignty of (inter)reacting agents in 
their decisions conceming the way of keeping those rules. "And we may not advance 
any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations", 
warns Wittgenstein. Then, he explains the gist of the proposed method: 
We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. 
And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical 
problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by 
looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us 
recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The pro-
blems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have 
always known (Wittgenstein 1958: § 109). 
And he ascertains the key flaw inherent in linguistic procedures aimed at 
(re)constructing the grammar of language that makes their models misrepresent the 
linguistic activity of communicating agents: 
A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a elear view 
of the use of our words. - Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A 
perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in "se-
eing connections". Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate 
cases. 
The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. 
It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things (Wittgenstein 
1958: § 122). 
Following Wittgenstein's suggestions regarding arranging and rearranging "what 
we have always known" (i. e., the uses oflinguistic expressions) in sucha way that can 
reveal previously unnoticed interconnections between investigated elements, we "want 
to establish an order in our knowledge of the use oflanguage: an order with a particu-
lar end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order" (Wittgenstein 1958: § 
132). Consequently, putting forward the model of communicative grammar, we are 
well aware of the deep truth in Roy Harris' succinct phrase stating that "there are no 
rules of grammar: there are only grammarians' rules" (Harris 1990: 74). And, because 
we treat communication not as a purpose oflanguage, but rather its attribute ( cf. Hymes 
1992: 39), the most important result of our survey should be disclosure of this intrin-
sic, communicative aspect of the linguistic phenomena. 
Thus, the framework upon which we are working is meant not as one more tenta-
tive (re)construction of the grammatical system of a language, but rather as a model 
accounting for the overall linguistic and cognitive activity that agents commonly per-
form in concrete acts of speaking. Seen from this perspective, our first task is to iden-
tify the previously mentioned intermediate cases that link particular components of 
agents' communicative competence (which have been ruled out or scattered over dif-
ferent moduł es of linguistic competence in previous linguistic theories), and to incor-
porate them into the larger, above-mentioned framework. 
20 ALEKSY AWDIEJEW, KRZYSZTOF KORŻYK 
The methodological perspective we have adopted, however, is, like Wittgenstein 's, 
a phenomenalistic one. One of the most important consequences of taking it on me ans 
that we are not trying to pin down the "essence" oflinguistic phenomena by "ground-
ing" them, "explaining," or relating them to any prerequisites that are to be discovered 
by means of deciphering or interpretive techniques. On the contrary, one of the many 
possible orders of linguistic phenomena, not the order itself, can only be found by 
reiterative (re )arranging of cases that we have always known, until the problem for the 
sake ofwhich we ha~e entered that game is solved. ~urther, somewhat parado~ical!y, 
disso/ving it would mean that "the essence" for wh1ch we have been searchmg has 
been found. The very fact that the problem has been solved means that an intrinsic 
aspect of the investigated case has been found. In that case, "the essence" of a ques-
tioned phenomenon would appear to be merely a by-product of the applied procedure 
- a hypostasis . 
In other WOjds , properties of linguistic phenomena, significant from the perspec-
tive invoked here, are not hidden. Paraphrasing Wittgenstein, one may say that they 
"!ie in open light", but usually it is "our forms of expressions [that] prevent us in all 
sorts ofways from seeing that nothing out of the ordinary is involved, by sending us in 
pursuit of chimeras" (Wittgenstein 1958: § 94). Reiterative rearranging of standard 
uses oflinguistic expressions permits us to survey those aspects of studied cases which 
would otherwise be untraceable. According to Wittgenstein: 
We fee) as ifwe had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is direc-
ted not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the "possibilities" of 
phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we 
make about phenomena. [ ... ] 
Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings 
a way. Misunderstandings conceming the use of words, caused, among other things, 
by certain analogi es between the fopns of expression in different regions of langu-
age. [ ... ] 
But no w it may come to look as if there were something like a finał analysis of our 
forms of language, and so a single completely resolved form of every expression. 
That is, as if our usual fonns of expression were, essentially, unanalysed; as ifthere 
were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light. When this is done 
the expression is completely clarified and our problem solved. 
It can also be put like this : we eliminate misunderstandings by making our expres-
sions more exact; but now it may look as if we were moving towards a particular 
state, a state of complete exactness; and as if this were the real goal of our investi-
gation. 
This finds expressions in questions as to the essence of Ianguage, of propositions, 
of thought. - For if we too in these investigations are trying to understand the 
essence of language - its function, its structure, - yet this is not what those qu-
estions have in view. For they see in the essence, not something that already Iies 
open to view and that becomes surveyable by a rearrangement, but something that 
lies beneath the surface. Something that Iies within, which we see when we look 
info the thing, and which an analysis digs out (Wittgenstein 1958: § 90-92). 
COMMUNICATIVE GRAMMAR 21 
Thus, it is not an "essence" of any kind, that, being hidden from us, should be 
revealed and identified. In a lang~age, as we see it, everything already lies open to 
view and becomes surveyable by rearranging what is already known. It is rather one of 
many possible orders - discemible via the aforementioned procedure - that is to be 
sought: an order that could account for the linguistic and cognitive activity performed 
by agents in concrete acts of linguistic communication. Such is one of the main pur-
poses of Communicative Grammar - nothing less and nothing more. 
3 . Communicative Grammar - The Gist of the Approach 
The kind of order about which we are speaking here can be traced when standard 
practice of human linguistic communication is taken into account. For those who ac-
cept the basie tenets of cognitive linguistics, it is obvious that, in real communicative 
behavior, grammar (whatever it may be "in and of itself') does not directly internet 
with text. Rather, it is that things go the way that Talmy Givón has convincingly put it: 
"the grammar manipulates (or is deployed by) the mind that in tum interprets (or pro-
duces) the text" (Givón 1990: 893) - the consequence of which is an obvious meth-
odological move which he proposes : re-interpretation of grammar as mental process-
ing instructions (Givón 1990: 893). From this point of view the text is not entirely the 
product of a language system, but the result of the creative effort of the speaker. Such 
creativity is possible only in a situation where rules presumably concem the forma! 
organization of a text, and, concurrently, its very meaning lies in the realm of free 
interpretation. We essentially see linguistic activity as it unfolds in the concrete act of 
communication the way this metaphor suggests (for it is a metaphor that should be 
interpreted seriously, albeit not literally). However, we also conceive linguistic activ-
ity along the lines drawn by M. A. K. Halliday (Halliday 1973, 1985). In the early 
stages of our work we found it useful to treat grammar as mental processing instruc-
tions constituting functional modules of a language system - "macrofunctions" or 
"metafunctions" in Halliday's own words. These "relatively discrete areas offonnal-
ized meaning potentia!" (Halliday 1973: 99)- i.e., the ideational or experiential, the 
interpersonal (which we prefer to call interactional), and the textual - deal with the 
three interwoven aspects of utterances/texts in the concrete act of communication. 
These are respectively: the message, the exchange, and the representation (Halliday 
1985: 32-37. 
The ideational/experiential module allows for expressing the agent's individual 
experience ( cf. Lako ff 1987; Johnson 1987) of the extemal world ("projected world," 
cf. Jackendoff 1983: 28-29), as well as the phenomena of his own consciousness. This 
module, according to Halliday's framework, comprises the processes, participants, 
and circumstances oftransitivity. From the logical point of view, one can represent the 
ideational meaning in the form of a proposition which could be subject to a truth/false 
accounting. The interpersonal/interactional module handles the "grammar of personal 
participation", that is, the interlocutor's role in the act of communication, his personal 
commitment to it, and his "doing things with words" in saying and by saying. From a 
purely linguistic point of view, this involves "genres of speech", modality, mood ( con-
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ceived as assessment ofprobabilities), etc. The textual module deals with the organi-
zation of the infonnation flow, the relationships between particular parts of the dis-
course, and the overall communicative structure. Grammatically, this is primarily ac-
complished by a thematic-rhematic structure ( information focus) and by different means 
of forma! expression ( compression, condensation, etc). 
The gist ofthis approach, as we see it, has been succinctly expressed by Halliday 
himself: 
" lfwe take the grammatical [ ... ] system, this is the system ofwhat the speaker can 
say [ ... ]. What the speaker can say, i.e. , the lexicogrammatical system as a whole, 
operates as the realization of the semantic system, which is w hat the speaker can 
mean- what I refer to as the "meaning potentia!"[ ... ]. Now, once we go outside the 
language, then we see that this semantic system is itself the realization of some-
thing beyond, which is what the speaker can do - I have referred to that as the 
"behaviour potentia!" (Halliday 1978: 39). 
Clearly, from a purely linguistic point of view, utterance is a combination of lin-
guistic signs whose structure and meaning is determined by the system of a particular 
language - a combination which has been actualized in some concrete act of commu-
nication. For a linguist then, utterance is, a manifestation of a structure of language. 
But in real, everyday communication, utterances function first and foremost as instru-
ments of social (inter)action and not as descriptions or manifestations of a reality of 
some kind or other. Thus, to say something, means, from this point of view, to perform 
an act towards somebody as regards something - to conclude, assert, deny, request, 
question, order, wam, promise, offer, apologize, thank, congratulate, declare , etc. 
As a result, the sense of an utterance or its function is determined not only by its 
linguistic structure, but also by the concrete parameters of the co1mnunicative envi-
ronment or pragmatic setting: i.e., by whom, towards whom, where, when, in what 
context, and to what purpose some words have been uttered. 
The self-evidentiality of a need for a linguistic theory for treating utterance as an 
instrument of social (inter)action can easily be proved even by appealing to the "clas-
sic", structuralist stance of thinking about language. 
As it is commonly known, the structuralist analysis of a text is aimed at identify-
ing primitive units of a linguistic system and at characterizing their value or function 
in this structure. It is usually accomplished by two basie analytical operations: seg-
mentation and substitution. As a result linguistic units of four levels are obtained -
sentences, morphemes, phonemes, and distinctive features. Units of a higher level are 
composed of the formative elements of a !ower level while being, at the same time, 
fonnative elements for units placed at the level above their own. 
These integrational (element - whole) relationships determine fonn and func-
tion (sense or value) of each linguistic unit. The form of a particular unit is simply an 
inventory and the ordering of its formative elements situated on the level of a system 
)ower than the unit in question. Concurrently, sense is the unit's potentia! for func-
tioning as a formative (or functional) element of a structure placed at a higher lin-
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guistic level. Thus, a particular linguistic unit has its form as a structure ofunits at a 
level !ower, and sense ( or value) as an element ( or building błock) of a unit from a 
level higher. (So the only elements oflanguage to which the status oflinguistic units 
may be granted are phonemes and morphemes.) The relations between language 
units of different levels in a real utterance cannot be reduced to a simple sum of the 
parts. From the communicative perspective, signs do not name things, but only indi-
cate them. 
Seen from this point of view, the sentence does not possess any linguistic sense -
if one were to understand it as we have just described - since there are no linguistic 
units larger than the sentence itself at a level higher than the one at which it is situated. 
There areno units ofwhich a sentence could be a formative or a functional part. From 
a purely linguistic, systemie point of view, a sentence can only be characterized for-
mally, but not functionally. Even if someone would like to treat a sentence as a func-
tional part of a text, one cannot because text is not an integrated who le in the sense that 
any linguistic unit is because sentences do not, in tum, constitute a text. They are 
simply being lined up, one after another, as someone pleases, in the process of the 
creation of communication. 
Consequently, the functional analysis of a sentence does not refer to any paradig-
matic or syntagmatic relationship between sentences but to a situation in which and 
with regard to which something has been said. Hence, to describe a sentence as a 
forma! and functional whole, one has to enter the realm of discourse, and take into 
account the pragmatic setting ofverbal interaction ofwhich a sentence is a part. Ulti-
mately, the sense of a sentence can only be revealed when it is studied as an utterance 
against the backdrop of a concrete pragmatic setting being established by the linguis-
tic activity of communi cating agents. 
Pondering questions ofthis kind, we arrive at the conclusion that models of gram-
mar - within which the agent's linguistic potentia! is treated as a repertory or inventory 
of symbol ie resources enabling interlocutors to (re/de )construct and interpret the mean-
ing of utterances - should be enriched in such a way that the description of linguistic 
means would take into account not only the intra-personal aspect oftheir functioning 
but the inter-personal as well. 
As a result, Communicative Gram mar essentially represents a process-oriented or 
procedura! approach to the study ofutterances or texts as they emerge in real commu-
nication. Consequently, although discemment and investigation oflinguistic and cog-
nitive units, structural regularities, and standard procedures is stili one of our goals, it 
is by no means a goal in and ofitself. We are primarily concemed with routine opera-
tions and the standard cognitive building blocks (understood as "mental prefabricates") 
which interlocutors utilize when processing texts in real communication. Arguing along 
the lines adopted by de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981), we could say that we are 
treating utterances (texts) and their parts as operational units and pattems that inter-
locutors employ for signaling meanings and purposes during communication. How-
ever, as far as the interactive ( or interpersonal) aspect of a communication is con-
cemed, linguistic utterances are not only means for signaling purposes but also for 
accomplishing them. 
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4. Operational Modules 
The Communicative Grammar put forward here to account for the linguistic and 
interpretational activity of interlocutors in the concrete acts of communication oper-
ates on three levels . These are meant to approximately mirror particular stages (if not 
concrete operations) of processing chunks of information en route from underlying 
semantic representation ("intended message") to the utterance with its full-fledged 
communicative val e (illocutionary force). Then, reversing this order, communicative 
grammar moves from ready-made, meaningful text or utterance back to the cognitive 
and inferential conditions of its appearance in communication - back to the initial 
element being an "intended message" that one has decided to make known by produc-
ing such a structure. 
As to the very existence of the intended message, despite all the doubts concern-
ing its ontological status that one might fos ter, it seems reasonable to posit its preexist-
ence in one form or another in the speaker's mind before engagement in the very act of 
communication. It is the intended message that determines or constrains the whole 
process of selecting and combining linguistic expressions into utterances and "genres 
of speech" performed by a speaker, who, as speech flows, constantly monitors the 
verbalizing procedure in order to maintain balance between his intention and the ulti-
mate communicative effect. 
Although the intended message could be thought of as being outside the act of 
language, and so, as an object of scholarly analysis, outside the linguist 's field of com-
petence, we posit its falling into the scope of linguistic study for severa! reasbns. 
One of the most important things is that we can talk of nothing we do not somehow 
experience. That is to say that the only limitation on what we can talk about is that we 
must be at least minimally aware of something - what we are talking about must im-
pinge upon our universe of experience - at the moment of speaking. Consequently, not-
withstanding some methodological difficulties in this formulation, the intended message 
should not be excluded from linguistic analysis because it constitutes the immediate 
extralinguistic referent for what is being uttered. Moreover, the fact that this referent 
places itself within the mind of a speaker and not outside it (being a part of - to use 
Lakoff's expression - one's experiential thought, and not some physical object) contrib-
utes to our view conceming meaningful and intentional phenomena being(re)constructed 
or inferred and not conveyed or transmitted. Every utterance, therefore, has a referent. As 
the outcome of an act of linguistic communication this refers to that part of a speaker's 
experience which, being his intended message, functions as the instance in relation to 
which the very process of"descending" thought into language is being controlled. 
Roughly speaking, the model that is being proposed consists of severa! opera-
tional moduł es: the paraphrasing module (which derives standard propositional struc-
tures from the pre-languaged intended message and assigns concrete deictic param-
eters to it- tense, aspect, localization, etc); the interactional module that converts such 
a standard structure into utterance meant as an instrument of social (inter)action (act 
of speech) in the concrete pragmatic setting; and the discoursive ( or textual) module 
transfonning utterance into, e.g., a rep lica of dialogic interaction ( or text), etc. 
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Approaching this structure frnm the point of view of cognitive linguistics, wherein 
graimnar is conveniently treated as a repertory of symbolic resources, one may also 
portray it as a list of terms and operators being placed on the three levels of grammar 
mentioned here - that is ideational, interactional and discoursive (textual). As a result 
severa! kinds of groups of standard linguistic units could be obtained: 
1. Lexicon of an ideational level 
1.1 List of ideational terms 
l .2 . List of operators 
1.2.1. List of operators of predication and syntactic connectors 
(Lexical and grammatical units/morphemes) 
1.2.2. List of operators of actualization 
1.2.2.1. List ofoperators and hybrid terms oftemporalization 
1.2.2.2. List of operators and hybrid terms of aspectualization 
1.2.2.3. List of hybrid terms oflocalization and topographization 
2. Lexicon of an interactional level 
2.1. List of pragmatic operators 
(Functional perspective of a sentence 
Pragmatic functions: 
• informational- stating, questioning, denying, accepting, persuading, etc.; 
• modal - certainty, presumption, urtcertainty, exclusion, moda! underspecifi-
cation, etc.; 
• axiological - introducing a scale of value, positioning of elements on the 
scale, etc.; 
• behavioral - proposing, asking, demanding, ordering, promising, advising, 
etc.; 
Transparency of a message ("situational hedges")) 
3. Lexicon ofa textual (discoursive) level 
3 .1. List of ritualizers 
3.2. List of operators of indexical terms 
3 .3 . List of operators of dialogization and textual arrangement: 
(Metatextual markers ("announcers") 
"Condensers"/ "economizers") 
Before proceeding to the actual presentation of a rationale behind this structure !et 
us briefly review some properties of the proposed elements. 
From the perspective of their functioning in the process of contributing meaning 
and organizing informational flow in a sentence, all the units of communicative gram-
mar can essentially be divided into two groups. The first group is that of terms, which 
we understand (with their logical or"computerese" connotations) as anyinformationally 
autonomous or self-sufficient linguistic units loaded with ideational con tent- whether 
morphemes, lexemes or phrases - singled out from a communicative point of view. 
The second group is that of operators, which we understand as linguistic units that 
express relationships between terms, or between "quanta" of infonnation being con-
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veyed by the utterance and the elements of particular background setting. This divi-
sion overlaps the other whose basie criteria reflect the systemie orientation of the gram-
mar considered as an inventory of linguistic resources. 
5 . General Characteristics of Units of Communicative Grammar 
Let us begin with the units of the ideational level of the model. Elements ofthis set 
fall into classes delineated~ n the basis of a linguistic-systemic categorization. For this 
purpose we simply adopted standard criteria allowing for recognition of a given unit as 
representing a particular "part of speech". However, in order to construct a model 
faithful to what is really going on in concrete acts of communication, we adjusted the 
received, standard classification by considering the functional role of those units -
played in conveying elements of information - the main criterion of our analysis. As a 
result, linking communicative units with "parts of speech" takes under consideration 
not their morphosyntactic properties but their semantically and pragmatically deter-
mined functions as "conveyers" and "organizers" of information flow in the structure 
of utterance. 
The main methodological novelty ofthis approach is the assumption that the for-
ma! boundaries of the communicative unit do not restrain its semantic (ideational) 
boundaries. Every tenn used in an utterance indicates a wid er scope of meaning, being 
only a part of it. This assumption compels us to accept the idea that the individual 
(autonomous) meaning ofa word is possible only on the metalinguistic level when we 
deal with the abstract semantic construct. In the case of real communication, a word 
indicates the localization in a certain ( one of many) semantic standard and therefore 
indicates the who le of sucha standard. 
From this perspective, a verb is considered to be the core of an analytic predicate-
argument structure, which connotes nomina! elements (names) as its argwnents; an 
adjective is, by the same token, the core of a secondary predicative-argument struc-
ture, and it also leaves room for its nominał argument. The adverb is treated as the core 
of secondary metapredication and leaves room for verbs and adjectives that are its 
arguments in the structure, and so on. Terms that actualize the meaning of the main 
predicate (tense, aspect, localization) are placed on a distinct list. These are chiefly 
lexical units, groups of units and analytical constructions denoting intervals of time 
and space. 
Thus, the basie property of each lexical unit is stil! its categorical value, i.e ., its 
"profile" as an instantiation of a particular part of speech and its subcategorical value 
concerning substitutional constraints. Besides, each term of the ideational level must 
be represented in the proper sublexicon by a set of semantic standards (predicates) 
representing its "meaning potentia!" and detennining its selective function. This infor-
mation should also be accompanied by morphological, inflectional, and syntactic in-
formation, along with generał rules concerning the possibility of combining particular 
terms with other units in a given semantic setting, and the list of grammatical opera-
tors needed for such a derivation. All this data should be strictly correlated with the 
previously mentioned semantic infonnation to allow for determining a standard and 
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nonstandard derivational path fo~ each investigated term. In a particular case it would 
also be useful to attach additional information to the term conceming its idiosyncratic 
( co )occurrences. 
Roughly, the overall structure of an entry concerning properties of a particular 
tenn can be rendered as follows: 
TERM [SUPERORDINATE CATEGORY - PART OF SPEECH], [SUBSTI-
TUTIONAL CATEGORIES], [SEMANTIC INFORMATION - CONSTRA-
INTS], [MORPHOLOGICAL INFORMATION - CONSTRAINTS - LIST OF 
INFLECTIONAL FORMS], [SYNTACTIC INFORMATION - CONSTRA-
INTS], [IDIOSYNCRATIC (CO)OCCURRENCES]. 
Properties of operators - being units relating terms to other terms or correlating 
"quanta" of information being conveyed by terms with the elements of a particular 
pragmatic setting - are to be described quite differently. As they function on each of 
the three levels of cornmunicative grammar their specificity must be mirrored accord-
ingly by the structure and by the content of an entry. Each of the entries should bring a 
"minigrammar" or a "microgrammar" governing the functioning of a particular opera-
tor on its appropriate level. This "minigrammar" should determine the effect ofputting 
an operator into use, and the scope of its influence, along with its forma! and semantic 
constraints. Operators of an ideational level are connectors - prepositions and con-
junctions. On an interactional level, there are various operators of speech; on a 
discoursive or textual level, there are operators of discourse acts and operators of 
dialogization ("ritualizers" included). In the lexicon of communicative grammar, a list 
of grarnmatical operators is arranged for the sake of the standard effects oftheir com-
municative usage. 
Again, roughly, the overall structure of an entry concerning properties of a par-
ticular operator can be illustrated as follows: 
OPERATOR[!DEATIONAL] ::::} [FUNCTIONAL EFFECT(S)], [SCOPE(S) OF IN-
FLUENCE], [FORMAL CONSTRAINTS], [SEMANTIC CONSTRAINTS] 
After this necessarily compendious, and obviously too brief a presentation of the 
units of an ideational level of grammar, we now progress to the other two large gro ups 
of operators functioning on the interactional and textual level of the model. 
Whereas the functioning of operators on the ideational level boils down to the 
modification of the meanings of terms, or the whole predicate-argument structures 
actualized in utterances, their basie function on the interactional level of grarnmar is 
the transformation of utterances into act of speech. lt is by this means that c01mnuni-
cating agents may establish a particular type of communicational relationship or ad-
j ust the concrete pragmatic parameters of their verba! interaction. Thus, an utterance 
considered against the backdrop of a particular act of speech is an instrument organiz-
ing social interaction by virtue of its pragmatic function - moda!, emotive-evaluative, 
operational, and persuasive (the last being essentially a metafunction). Operators that 
28 ALEKSY AWDIEJEW, KRZYSZTOF KORŻYK 
actualize those functions are chiefly analytic or analytic-synthetic constructions whose 
scope of influence usually involves the whole structure of an utterance or even larger 
fragments of text. As for the metafunction of persuasion, this is realized by opera tors 
that intensify the effects of particular acts of speech. 
Overall, the structure of an en try conceming the properties of a particular operator 
located on this level can be rendered as fellows : 
OPERATORcINrERACTIONAL] ~ [FUNCTIONAL EFFECT(S)], [SCOPE(S) OF 
INFLUENCE], [FOR.rv1fil, CONSTRAINTS], [SEMANTIC CONSTRAINTS], 
[PRAGMATIC CONSTRAINTS]. 
Three groups of units operate on the textual level : ritualizers ( customary verba! 
sequences being used for opening, sustaining, and closing chains of verba! interac-
tions ); metatextual markers arranging an information flow in a text by drawing inter-
locutors' attention to the manipulations being performed on particular fragments of a 
text (relating/binding pieces of information, setting forth ideas, amplifying a subject, 
explicating, summing up etc.); and "condensers" or "economizers" ( operators that sub-
stantially reduce the number of significant elements of a text while concurrently main-
taining its informativeness). All of them are basically autonomous, often polyfunctional 
lexical units, with a "microgrammar" oftheir own, which means that we currently stili 
lack sound principles for the detailed description of their functioning. 
6 . Operational Aspects of the Model 
Now, after this brief exposition of the interpretational means offered by the gram-
mar, !et us take a closer look at the operational aspect of the proposed structure. 
First, close attention should be paid to the initial module of the proposed model -
the paraphrasing module ( or module of intenJion ) - and, strictly speaking, to one of the 
most important domains of communication pertinent to this component - to the 
communicational intention of the speaker or to the recoverable-in-the-process-of-in-
terpretation part of the speaker's "experiential thought" that is conveniently called 
"intended message". 
Making this particular component a part of the grammar seems necessary in view 
of the fact that the grammar itself - being but an inventory of symbolic resources and 
not a device of any kind - is unable to produce utterances or texts . Regardless of the 
particular methodological perspective adopted in linguistic research, only the commu-
nicating agent can employ means from the repertory of symbolic resources in order to 
make his " intended message" known to the interlocutor, and to accomplish his own 
communicative purposes via the production ofutterances and acts of speech. Accord-
ingly, it is solely his partner, who, guided by thePrinciple of Relevance (Sperber and 
Wilson 1995: 158), is able to (re)construct the speaker's intention (to which, obvi-
ously, the addressee can not have direct access) by interpreting the meaning of the 
linguistic expressions used and inferencing their communicative value in a particular 
pragmatic setting. 
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The term (re)construction is deliberately put here in sucha form as to draw atten-
tion to the fact that linguistic meanfog is neither being conveyed nor passed on through 
a kind of communicative channel - unlike the norma! way of tal king abo ut conveying 
or passing on a message in terms of the Conduit Metaphor (Reddy 1995: 164-201). It 
rather results from a kind of interpretational-negotiational activity (re )iteratively per-
formed by the interlocutors involved in a communicative interaction. On the one hand, 
from the speaker's perspective, it emerges as a communicative phenomenon following 
his execution of communicative tasks by uttering sentences. On the other hand, from 
the perspective of the addressee, it appears as an outcome of his (re)constructional 
activity aimed at inferring the communicational value of the expressions used. Thus, 
when employed in a communicative environment, words usually function for the in-
terlocutors as a medium or an operational tool for matching the standard meaning 
ascribed by the conventional symbolism of a language to the expressions used, and 
their communicative value is hypothesized by the addressee who commonly interprets 
them as the speaker's means of making his own "intended message" known to the 
other(s). As a consequence, also pertinent to this module are preverbal schemas or 
pl ans regarding the execution of communicative tasks. We call this "blend" a commu-
nicative intention . 
When talking about this we have in mind at least three different communicative 
modi operandi of an utterance. These modi could conveniently be rendered as answers 
to key questions: 1) w hat is to be said (made known to the addressee ); 2) w hat kind of 
a pragmatic/communicative goal is to be accomplished by saying, and what kind of a 
moda! relationship between communicating agents is to be established in saying, some-
thing in a particular pragmatic setting; and 3) how should the particular utterance/text 
be constructed (genres of speech, stylistic pattems etc.) in order to accomplish a par-
ticular goal. 
The first element of such a conceived intention is a particular mental, ideational 
image - a linguistically standardized con cep tu al structure representing that part of the 
speaker's experience which is to be "conveyed" or communicated via linguistic means. 
The second aspect of the information with which the module ofintention deals is 
the interactional aspect of the functioning of a particular utterance in the concrete act 
of communication. In other words, it handles those pragmatic and interactional vari-
ables that the speaker takes into account in order to accomplish his communicative 
goals via uttering the particularly shaped message. 
The third aspect of a piece of information deals with forma!, compositional, stylis-
tic, and generic ("genre of speech") aspects of an utterance. All three of these aspects 
of intention may, of course, be studied separately, but in real communication they 
usually internet in a way that creates an enhanced combined effect- a synergy. 
Another important clue goveming the type of analysis that is being proposed here 
is the plain fact that texts or utterances as they are commonly used in real communica-
tion are mostly under-specified with respect to their illocutionary aspect and their com-
municative value. A message as it is produced online is seidom informationally com-
plete by itself. What is explicitly being communicated and easy recoverable through 
the standard construal of the literał meaning of a message stili requires context-sensi-
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tive interpretation in order to be properly understood against the backdrop of a particu-
lar pragmatic setting. Usually this is accomplished by the interlocutors' generating 
deductive ( or reductive) quasi-logical inferences, meant to rearrange or improve upon 
the overall representation of the world implied (its discoursive or indexical component 
included). This very process is being pragmatically constrained by the Principle of 
Relevance according to which the greater the cost of processing a particular linguistic 
means, the less its communicative relevance in a given pragmatic setting. Conversely, 
the greater the contextua effect of putting a particular linguistic means into use, the 
greater its communicative relevance in this context. 
Thus, the standard, literał meaning of a sentence (or the "propositional fonn" of 
an utterance) is, for an interlocutor, merely a kind of a stimulus or a signal for the 
inferencing process to commence. In this process, the propositional form of an utter-
ance is treated as the interpretatio n of a thought ( attributed or desirable) of the speaker 
,or as a representation of an actual (desirable) state of affairs. Speaking in generał 
tenns, a full-fledged interpretation is accomplished by the addressee's supplementa-
tion of the propositional form of the message with information being invoked from 
two main sources. The first is the standard systematic context to which the utterance or 
text directly or indirectly refers (this domain involves standard situational, discoursive, 
and indexical information). The second is the nonstandard context of the interlocutor 's 
operational knowledge, i.e., a set of additional assumptions that, from the interpreter 's 
point of view, should be taken as relevant to the proper understanding of the meaning 
of a message along with its communicative value and its pragmatic function. Thus, the 
information (message) embodied in an utterance may be conveniently represented in 
this fonnula : 
M = C, S, I, {F [(p) t, loc, asp]} 
wherein C stands for contextual infonńation, S - for situational information, and I 
- for indexical information. By F we mean the function of interaction equal to the 
pragmatic intention of a speaker as made known by the utterance of a sentence in a 
particular pragmatic setting. This set ofvariables constitutes a background framework 
for a proposition (predicate-argument structure) which can further be actualized by 
expressions of time (t), localization (Joe) and aspect (asp ). Each of the symbols pro-
posed in the formula represents a distinct informational domain from within which the 
element can be invoked in the process of deriving inferences pertaining to the meaning 
of an utterance. 
Interpretation obtained through this process is usually contingent upon the knowl-
edge constituting the basis from which inferences are derived. We consider this basis a 
kind of semantic representation - one which can be characterized as the symbolic, 
essentially propositional form that, in a given language, refers to a particular image 
schema (in the Lakoffian sense) . These forms -which we have decided to callseman-
tic standards because of the way they function in the process of drawing inferences -
while generally similar to defaults in computer science (in the sense that a particular 
value for a variable is assigned automatically by an operating system and remains in 
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effect unless cancelled or overridqen by the user), are actually parts of the system of 
representation of a particular linguistic image of the world. They consist of common, 
stereotypical knowledge, usually characterized by a kind of"folk quantification," e.g., 
everyone knows (or believes) that p. Any attempt to verbalize such units would yield 
trivia!, "noninformative" utterances that would state common truths, obvious to every 
speaker of a particular language - the effect being the essential mark of every semantic 
standard. Therefore, utterances being the "unfoldings" of the predicative or propositional 
configurations that refer to semantic standards, are usually not used in real communi-
cation unless some educational activity is involved. The obvious reason for this is that 
they do not require any interpretative activity, and, as a result, cannot change the agents' 
structures ofknowledge. 
As has been stated before, any utterance, which by virtue of the Principle ofRel-
evance leads to non trivia! consequences against the background of someone 's opera-
tional knowledge, does that precisely because it lacks an infonnational completeness. 
It is exactly this factor which, in a particular pragmatic setting, triggers a process of 
generating inferences until they satisfy the interlocutor's requirements of comprehen-
sion. An informationally incomplete (in a particular pragmatic setting) utterance, which 
would therefore require context-sensitive interpretation, could only be one that did not 
verbalize (unfold) any semantic standard or default. Vice versa, any creative interpre-
tation of utterances of this kind requires reference to the semantic standards against 
which a particuiar message could be interpreted as nontrivial. 
7. Semantic Standards and Detrivialization 
- A Tutorial in Interpretation 
Let us introduce a simple example. lt will be confined to only such operations of 
detrivialization that can be executed on the basis of information being explicitly sup-
plied on the textuai level of the message itself. An elementary step (manipulation) 
allowing for nontrivial interpretation of an utterance is to specify at least one of the 
elements of the informational domains invoked in the previously introduced formula. 
Let us take a trivia! utterance: 
(I) A doctor treats a patient. 
The utterance in question is semantically isomorphous to a standard predicate 
TREAT [DOCTOR, PATIENT]. In other words, it is a plain verbalization of a seman-
tic standard to which the introduced predicate refers. The utterance can be interpreted 
as omnitemporal or as one that does not encourage placing the particuiar action in any 
tempora! setting. The same holds for location and aspectual information. To transfonn 
this structure into nontrivial utterance it would suffice to specify any element pertinent 
to a background framing of the sentence or, while still remaining on a propositional 
level, to specify any of the potentia! arguments of a core predicate. Ifwe would say: 
(2) A [famous] doctor treats a patient. 
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this would entail senses like: a doctor is highly competent, or an illness itself is 
serio us if not terminal, or a patient means something to him ( or is equally famo us), or 
a patient will certainly be cured, etc. All this could be inferred only by an interpreter 
who knows the standard according to which someone who is famous does not deal 
with man-in-the-street problems unless some unusual reasons are involved, and the 
standard- one who is famous, from a professional point of view is usually very good 
at what he/she does. 
(3) A doctor treats a p~tient [efficiently]. 
This utterance could evoke a standard suspicion that regular treatment is usually 
inefficient or that some other consultant did not previously give a patient a chance to 
be cured. In fact, utterances like that can be "communicatively felicitous" solely against 
the background of the standards invoked. 
( 4) A doctor treats [his} patient efficiently. 
This could properly be understood only if considered against the background of a 
standard, folk knowledge => [most doctors (as paradigmatic representatives of this 
money-hungry profession which is another common truth cJaimed to be known to 
everybody) treat unknown patients inefficiently-most likely to draw a max.imał amount 
of money from their pockets.] 
(5) A doctor treats [hisfriend]. 
This example implies that the person in question is treated in a special way. Yet 
this could be inferred only by one, who knows the standard describing (and, at the 
same time - prescribing) a typical demeanor towards friends => [ we should treat our 
friends in the best of possible manners; they deserve it as persons who mean some-
thing to us]. 
(6) A [consultantj treats a [movie star}. 
This structure implies that he or she receives the best medical attention money can 
buy. Still, the implication is derivable only by previously invoking the standard of a 
movie star like [he/she is very rich] and a consultant [a consultant that is allowed to 
treat a movie star must be ofhighest rank], [consultants who treat movie stars usually 
charges flabbergasting rates for his/her services] and the like. 
(7) A [consultant] treats a patient. 
It calls for inferring a sense that the patient's disease is so serious, atypical or 
complicated that it cannot be dealt with by a generał practitioner, or that a patient can 
afford special services, or he/she means something to the consultant. All these infer-
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ences are contingent upon a standard [a consultant usually does not treat a patient 
unless he/she deserves (for whatev-er reason) special attention]. 
(8) A doctor treats a/an [schizophrenic, epileptic, hemophiliac, rheumatic etc}. 
In a case Iike this, conversely to the previous example, the inference is based 
upon a standard according to which patients with diseases that call for a special 
treatment should be assisted by doctors sufficiently qualified to deal with them, 
like e.g., consultants. Against the background ofthis standard, an interpretation of 
the utterance reads as follows : a patient is assisted by an "ordinary" doctor be-
cause he cannot afford a consultant, or the disease is not serious - or it could also 
be guessed that the expression " a doctor" in the utterance actually refers to a con-
sultant. 
Similar effects could be obtained by specifying any element of the tempora!, locative 
or aspectual domain. 
A very powerful means of detrivialization is the disturbance of the ordering of 
arguments within a particular standard. This can be observed in sentences like these: 
(9) A patient treats a doctor. 
A child beats his mother. 
An alcoholic drinks minera! water. 
The possibility of communicatively "felicitous" interpretations of sentences of 
this type is a consequence of the very existence ofparticular semantic standards in the 
linguistic image of the world against the background of which nontrivial inferences 
can be derived. These are so obvious that we will not dwell upon them here. 
Now, !et us take another example - one in which an utterance contains a nontrivial 
predicate complex, nonisomorphous to any semantic standard. In such cases a predi-
cate does not verbalize standard information: 
(10) A doctor beats a patient. 
Here we have a blending of two mutually independent semantic standards : 
FS (XA): BEAT [perpetrator, victimj & S (XA) : TREAT [doctor, patient]. 
The first structure specification of its standard arguments - that is, a perpetrator 
and a victim - allows for verbalizations such as: 
( 11) A hoodlum beats a pass er-by. 
A criminal beats an ald man. 
After inserting the term [doctor] in the position of the perpetrator, we obtain a 
metaphorical reference that could be rendered as follows : 
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!MP:::::} [A doctor beats a patient instead of treating him}, 
[A doctor, who beats a patient, acts like (or turns into) a hoodlum, criminal, etc.] 
In such instances, we also have a contrast ofvalues assigned to the standards used, 
because the predicate TREAT bears a standard positive value whereas BEAT, con-
strued in a standard way, is evaluated negatively. This disparity itself evokes explicit 
morał judgement. 
These quite simple pri ciples of understanding show the prerequisites of the 
communicative grammar as a tool ofinterpretation. Naturally, we are aware that such 
rules of interpretatio n are of amore complicated nature and should be described more 
precisely for practical purposes. At present, we are simply illustrating our interpreta-
tive ap pro ach via an example of informational analysis of a real fragment of text. 
( 12) One beautiful evening John joyfully went home because Mary with a bashful 
smile had at last answered his tormenting question. 
The substance of this utterance is represented by two main predicates which are 
connected by a causa! relationship. This relationship is expressed with the syntactical 
operator [BECAUSE]. It indicates the predominant place of the causa) predicate: 
(13) ANSWER [MARY, QUESTION]:::::} GO [JOHN, HOME] 
One easily notices that this forma) configuration has nothing to do with the proper 
infonnational perspective which is connected rather with the secondary predicate ex-
pressed by the non-isomorphic communicative unit [JOYFULLY]. The non-isomor-
phic character ofthis unit is proved by the fact that it does not modify the meaning of 
the verb [GO] and in the informative sense e:reates the timely parallel predicate: 
(14) (TO BE) JOYFUL [JOHN] 
which leads to the proper result of the expressed causality. In other words, this 
causa! relationship can only carry any sense ifwe formulate it timely in the following 
way: 
(15)(-t2)ANSWER [MARY, QUESTION]:::::} (-tł) (TO BE) JOYFUL (JOHN) /\ 
GO [JOHN, HOME] 
This fundamental informational base was diversely extended. First of all , time 
actualizers [ONE EVENING] were applied. The application of time indicators is not 
obligatory and this operation is one of the possible instruments of detrivialization of 
an utterance. The grammatical forms of the past [WENT, HAD ANSWERED] more 
strictly indicate the time of [GO, ANSWER]. We can judge the sequence of events 
with the help of a standard semantic script of a question answered in a love situation. 
Typically, all time information is of an external character. 
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Secondary predicates also create another element of extension. Two of them, SMILE 
[MARY]/\ SHY [MARY], are connected with the sense of the main predicate, AN-
SWER [MARY, QUESTION]. The secondary metaphorical predicate, TORMENT 
[QUESTION, JOHN], is probably concemed with the period of time when John was 
expecting an answer. The last two informational units, BEAUTIFUL [EVENING] and 
AT LAST [ANSWER], do not belong, in our opinion, to the ideational level of the 
language. They express the speaker's evaluation being made on an interactional level, 
and cannot be compared directly with the proper ideational infonnation. 
This surface analysis allows us to formulate the following informational script: 
(16)(t-4) PUT [JOHN, QUESTION] => 
(t-3) WAIT [JOHN, (FOR THE) ANSWER] 
TORMENT [QUESTION, JOHN]=> (t-2) ANSWER [MARY, QUESTION] 
/\ SHY [MARY] /\ SMILE [MARY]=> (t-1) (TO BE) JOYFUL [JOHN] 
A GO [JOHN, HOME] 
A subsequent, deep analysis of the text, should be concemed with the description 
of all the semantic standards involved in such an investigation. For example, we have 
neither explicit information about the content of the question, nor the answer in the 
text. A standard interpretation compels us to accept the prototypical standard (QUES-
TION) JOHN: DO YOU LOVE ME?=> (ANSWER) MARY: YES, I DO, which we 
can select from quite numerous scripts about love and its behavioral models. All se-
mantic operations on this level of analysis are very difficult to fonnulate and describe. 
Fortunately, these operations are not the subject of the present paper. But without such 
research we could not build a complete model ofpeople's understandings oftexts and 
utterances. 
8. Outro 
Thus, elements of the semantic standards of the type we have just discussed are a 
part of a basie component of cmmnunicative grammar. They constitute an important 
piece of semantic information ascribed to the units operating on the ideational level of 
grammar. And they, at the same time, function as an inferential bas is for agents' inter-
pretive activity in concrete acts of communication. 
Inevitably, an account of this activity should involve delineating standard, trivia! 
cognitive configurations constituting a basis for subsequent operations of deriving gram-
matical form and meaning. However, in view of the uniqueness ofevery communica-
tive intention ( or intended message ), along with the fact that linguistically encoded 
infonnation is not "conveyed" in the act of communication on the level of generał 
knowledge, but rather on the operational and indexical one, a rigorous accounting of 
this phenomenon would seem to be extremely difficult. Nevertheless, what can and 
should be done, even at this stage ofresearch, is to concentrate on modeling the inter-
pretive part of the grarmnar, starting from trivia! text/utterance-sense, and to reduce 
the modeling of the productive aspect of communication to the level of the verbaliza-
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tion of semantic standards most important for a particular linguistic image of the world. 
As a result, we would obviously obtain semantically correct, although quite trivia! and 
non-informative, utterances, lacking any communicative value. However, having them, 
having a kind of a map of semantic standards vital to success ful communication in a 
particular language, we would be able to compare those structures with their informa-
tive, nontrivial counterparts as they appear in real communication. Therefore, we could 
possibly discern and study in detail successive stages in the process of inferring 
non trivia! ( and nonstandar ) senses by employing standard interpretive means in a 
particular pragmatic setting. 
Summary 
The article presents the basie tenets of Communicative Grammar - a new methodo-
logical framework which proposes a holistic approach to language studies. In this ap-
proach, the cognitive and functional (pragmatic) constraints on processing linguistically 
standardized information are considered to be the main factors affecting the organization 
of a grammar. The informational units, the principles of their combining, and the commu-
nicative results of this combining are the principal goals of the Communicative Grammar 
description. The grammar consists of three modules or components which correspond to 
the three aspects of a human verbalizing potentia! -intention, interpretation and produc-
tion - and which operate on three levels - ideational, interactional and textual. The au-
thors ofthis concept hope that the proposed methodology will make various applications 
possible in those areas where models of an agent's linguistic activity are involved. 
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